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THE PROBLEM WITH PRETEXT
THE HONORABLE TIMOTHY M. TYMKOVICH
t
ABSTRACT
When deciding whether to grant a party summaryjudgment or a di-
rected verdict, appellate courts ordinarily evaluate whether the plaintiff
produced sufficient evidence to establish each element of his claim. In
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,1 the Supreme Court deviated from
this long-standing practice, and held that in Title VII cases courts must
evaluate evidence of discrimination under a novel three-part burden-
shifting framework. While the Supreme Court initially insisted this inno-
vation was necessary to ensure that plaintiffs have their day in court,
many scholars, practitioners, and judges now recognize that the
McDonnell Douglas framework creates complication and confusion. In
this article, I survey the competing methodologies and suggest the time
might be right for a simpler, more direct method of evaluating the ques-
tion of discrimination.
INTRODUCTION
Under the now familiar McDonnell Douglas framework, a court
must proceed through three phases to determine liability in an employ-
ment discrimination case.2 First, the employee has the burden of estab-
lishing a prima facie case of discrimination by the preponderance of the
evidence. The prima facie case of discrimination4 must consist of evi-
t Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. I gratefully acknowl-
edge the contributions of my law clerks David Strandness and James Wawrzyniak.
1. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
2. Although initially developed for cases arising under Title VII, the McDonnell Douglas
framework was subsequently expanded to cases arising under the Age Discrimination in Employ-
ment Act (ADEA). Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111 (1985); Americans with
Disabilities Act (ADA), Berry v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 490 F.3d 1211, 1220 (10th Cir. 2007); and
Family and Medical Leave Act, Metzler v. Federal Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 464 F.3d 1164,
1170 (10th Cir. 2006).
3. See, e.g., Timmerman v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 483 F.3d 1106,1113 (10th Cir. 2007).
4. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 506 (1993); McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S.
at 802. The prima facie case differs depending on the plaintiff's protected status. In every case,
however, the plaintiff must present some evidence of the employer's intent to discriminate because
of the protected status. To establish a prima facie case of age discrimination, a plaintiff must show:
(1) membership within a protected age group; (2) evidence of satisfactory work; (3) an adverse
employment action; and (4) some evidence the employer discriminated based on age. E.g., Pippin v.
Burlington Res. Oil and Gas Co., 440 F.3d 1186, 1192-93 (10th Cir. 2006). To establish a prima
facie case of disability discrimination, a plaintiff must show: (1) a disability under the ADA; (2)
qualification to perform the job; and (3) some evidence the employer discriminated because of the
disability. E.g., MacKenzie v. City & County of Denver, 414 F.3d 1266, 1274 (10th Cir. 2005). To
establish a prima facie case of retaliation, a plaintiff must show: (1) protected opposition to dis-
crimination; (2) an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection between the opposition
and the employment action. E.g., Somoza v. Univ. of Denver, No. 06-1488, 2007 WL 4465244, at
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dence that (1) the victim belongs to a protected class; (2) the victim suf-
fered an adverse employment action; and (3) the challenged action took
place under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. 5
If the employee succeeds in establishing a prima facie case, the bur-
den of production shifts to the employer to articulate a "legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason" for the adverse employment action.6 The court
need not believe the employer's reason, so long as it is plausible. Once
the employer supplies its reason, the presumption of discrimination at-
tendant to the plaintiffs prima facie case is rebutted.7
The third-and most important-step in the tripartite scheme then
arises: the pretext inquiry. In this final step, the employee must carry
the burden of proof in showing that the employer's action stemmed from
the discriminatory basis alleged.8 That is, the plaintiff must prove the
employer's proffered legitimate nondiscriminatory reason was pretex-
tual.
To prove pretext, the plaintiff must produce evidence of "such
weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contra-
dictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for its action that
a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence
and hence infer that the employer did not act for the asserted nondis-
criminatory reasons." 9 "The relevant inquiry as to a proffered reason's
falsity 'is not whether the employer's proffered reasons were wise, fair or
correct, but whether it honestly believed those reasons and acted in good
faith upon those beliefs."' ' 1° Because this pretext inquiry is necessarily a
motive inquiry, a great deal of subjectivity inevitably attaches.
If the plaintiff succeeds in showing evidence of pretext, summary
judgment1' in favor of the employer is inappropriate and the case should
go to the factfinder. 12 Likewise, summary judgment at this stage in favor
*3 (10th Cir. Dec. 21, 2007); Haynes v. Level 3 Commc'ns, LLC, 456 F.3d 1215, 1228 (10th Cir.
2006).
5. E.g., Sorbo v. United Parcel Serv., 432 F.3d 1169, 1173 (10th Cir. 2005).
6. St. Mary's Honor Ctr., 509 U.S. at 506-07.
7. Id. at 507.
8. Id. at 507-08.
9. Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319, 1323 (10th Cir. 1997) (quoting Olson v. Gen. Elec.
Astrospace, 101 F.3d 947, 951-52 (3d Cir. 1996)); see also Argo v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of
Kan., Inc., 452 F.3d 1193, 1203 (10th Cir. 2006); Bryant v. Farmers Ins. Exchange, 432 F.3d 1114,
1125 (10th Cir. 2005).
10. Nguyen v. Gambro BCT, Inc., 242 F. App'x 483, 489 (10th Cir. June 20, 2007) (quoting
Rivera v. City and County of Denver, 365 F.3d 912, 924-25 (10th Cir. 2004)).
11. It is important to emphasize that the McDonnell Douglas framework was not initially
developed as a tool for evaluating summary judgment motions. Wells v. Colorado Dep't of Transp.,
325 F.3d 1205, 1227 (10th Cir. 2003) (Hartz, J., concurring). The opinion makes no reference to
summary judgment. The Supreme Court did not apply the framework to a summary judgment
motion until twenty-three years later in O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers Corp., 517 U.S.
308 (1996). As I will explain below, McDonnell Douglas has its greatest impact at the summary
judgment stage of a case.
12. Ingels v. Thiokol Corp., 42 F.3d 616, 622 (10th Cir. 1994).
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of the employee is also inappropriate.' 3  Thus, "if a plaintiff advances
evidence establishing a prima facie case and evidence upon which a fact-
finder could conclude that the defendant's alleged nondiscriminatory
reasons for the employment decisions are pretextual, the case should go
to the factfinder."'
' 4
As I will show, this focus on pretext has shifted the emphasis of an
employment discrimination case away from the ultimate issue of whether
the employer discriminated against the complaining employee. By
adopting this unique burden-shifting framework in lieu of the more cus-
tomary sufficiency of the evidence standard, the Supreme Court has left
the entire area of law confused.
I. THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS FRAMEWORK
A. Supreme Court Case Law
When deciding whether to grant a party summary judgment or a di-
rected verdict, appellate courts ordinarily determine whether the plaintiff
produced enough evidence to establish each element of the claim.' 5 In
McDonnell Douglas v. Green the Supreme Court announced that courts
should deviate from this long-standing practice in Title VII cases, and
instead evaluate the evidence under a three-part burden-shifting frame-
work. 16
Although the Court imposed a framework that substantially devi-
ated from past practices, it failed to explain or justify its decision.
Scholars and judges initially concluded McDonnell Douglas was a
"plaintiff-friendly opinion,"' 7 designed to "ease the evidentiary burdens
13. See, e.g., Ingels, 42 F.3d at 621-22 ("[A] factfmder may, but is not required to, find dis-
crimination when a plaintiff presents evidence that the defendant's proffered reasons are unworthy
of credence."); Whittington v. Nordam Group Inc., 429 F.3d 986, 993 (10th Cir. 2005) ("A showing
that the employer's justifications for its behavior are pretextual permits a finding of intentional
discrimination.") (quoting Exum v. U.S. Olympic Comm'n, 389 F.3d 1130, 1135 (10th Cir. 2004)).
14. Ingels, 42 F.3d at 622; Bryant, 432 F.3d at 1125; see also Morgan, 108 F.3d at 1323.
15. Wells, 325 F.3d at 1221 (Hartz, J., concurring).
16. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (describing the three-part
burden-shifting framework); see also Wells, 325 F.3d at 1221 ("The McDonnell Douglas framework
is a departure from the approach appellate courts customarily use in evaluating the sufficiency of the
evidence to sustain a plaintiff's case, whether reviewing judgments after trial or summary judg-
ments."); Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of
Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 215 (1993) (explaining in
McDonnell Douglas "the Court departed from the traditional order of proof in a civil case"); Sandra
F. Sperino, Flying Without a Statutory Basis: Why McDonnell Douglas is not Justified by Any
Statutory Construction Methodology, 43 HOuS. L. REV. 743, 753 (2006) ("The three-part burden-
shifting framework was a significant change from the tests that other lower courts previously had
used in disparate treatment discrimination cases."); Jeffrey A. Van Detta, 'Le Roi Est Mort; Vive Le
Roi!': An Essay on the Quiet Demise of McDonnell Douglas and the Transformation of Every Title
VII Case After Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa into a 'Mixed Motives' Case, 52 DRAKE L. REv. 71, 84-
92 (2003) (explaining how the McDonnell Douglas framework departed from "common-law plead-
ing and practice").
17. Wells, 325 F.3d at 1224 (Hartz, J., concurring) (explaining that McDonnell Douglas was
"viewed at the time as a plaintiff-friendly opinion").
2008]
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on employment discrimination plaintiffs, who rarely are fortunate
enough to have access to direct evidence of intentional discrimination.,
18
In subsequent opinions, the Court concurred with this assessment.
1 9
The Court's groundbreaking opinion also created substantial confu-
sion in the lower courts. Most notably, a circuit split developed over the
question of what constituted the defendant's burden at the second stage
of the McDonnell Douglas analysis-the employer's explanation of the
adverse action. Some courts, 20 including the Tenth Circuit, 21 concluded
the defendant had the burden of persuasion: In order to rebut the pre-
sumption of discrimination, the defendant had to prove by a preponder-
ance of the evidence the existence of a non-discriminatory reason for the
adverse action. Other courts interpreted McDonnell Douglas as merely
requiring the defendant to produce some evidence of a legitimate reason
for the action.22
The Supreme Court settled this debate eight years later in Texas
Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine.23 In order to rebut the
presumption of discrimination, the defendant must only satisfy a burden
of production. The burden, furthermore, is relatively easy to overcome.
The "defendant need not persuade the court that it was actually moti-
vated by the proffered reasons .... It is sufficient if the defendant's evi-
dence raises a genuine issue of fact as to whether it discriminated against
the plaintiff.,
24
The Burdine opinion implies that once a plaintiff satisfies an initial
burden of establishing a prima facie case of discrimination, little differ-
ence exists between a case evaluated under the McDonnell Douglas
framework and a case evaluated under a traditional sufficiency of the
evidence standard. 5 Because a defendant almost always satisfies its
burden of production,26 the third stage of the McDonnell Douglas
18. Grigsby v. Reynolds Metals Co., 821 F.2d 590, 595 (11 th Cir. 1987); see also McGinley,
supra note 16, at 215 ("Because a plaintiff alleging discrimination under the disparate treatment
theory must prove that the defendant intended to discriminate, and intent is generally difficult to
prove absent a smoking gun, the Court departed from the traditional order of proof in a civil case.").
19. See, e.g., Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston, 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985) ("The shifting
burdens of proof set forth in McDonnell Douglas are designed to assure that the plaintiff [has] his
day in court despite the unavailability of direct evidence.") (internal quotation marks omitted).
20. See Burdine v. Tex. Dep't of Cmty. Affairs, 608 F.2d 563, 567 (5th Cir. 1979); Williams
v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
21. See Higgins v. Gates Rubber Co., 578 F.2d 281,284 (10th Cir. 1978).
22. Lieberman v. Gant, 630 F.2d 60, 65 (2d Cir. 1980); Jackson v. U.S. Steel Corp., 624 F.2d
436, 443 (3d Cir. 1980); Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1025 (1st Cir. 1979) (Bownes, J.,
concurring and dissenting).
23. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
24. Id. at 254.
25. See Wells v. Colorado Dep't of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1224 (10th Cir. 2003) (Hartz, J.,
concurring) ("Burdine did not, however, dispel all confusion. Indeed, by clarifying that the prima
facie case did not shift the burden of persuasion, it raised the question whether the McDonnell Doug-
las framework accomplished much of anything.").
26. Van Detta, supra note 16, at 101 ("This 'burden' to 'articulate' a legitimate nondiscrimi-
natory reason ... is really no burden at all.").
[Vol. 85:3
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framework-the pretext stage-becomes the most critical. Burdine's
description of this step, furthermore, is similar to a description of the
analysis a court would undertake in evaluating the sufficiency of the evi-
dence in a non-Title VII case: The plaintiff "may succeed in [proving
discrimination] either directly by persuading the court that a discrimina-
tory reason more likely motivated the employer or indirectly by showing
that the employer's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. 27
Thus, starting with Burdine, the Supreme Court began to move in
the direction of returning to a traditional sufficiency of the evidence
standard. The cases that followed Burdine reinforced the new approach
in two main ways. First, the Court clarified that when considering evi-
dence of pretext, courts should analyze the adequacy of the plaintiffs
evidence in the same manner they would evaluate it under a traditional
sufficiency of the evidence standard. Second, the Court limited the rele-
vancy and applicability of the McDonnell Douglas framework.
1. Pretext Analysis and the Traditional Sufficiency of the Evidence
Standard
In two opinions following Burdine, the Court clarified that the pre-
text stage of the McDonnell Douglas test is no different than an ordinary
sufficiency of the evidence analysis.
a. St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks
2 8
In the first case, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, the plaintiff al-
leged that he was demoted and discharged because of his race. After a
bench trial, the district court entered judgment in favor of the employer.2 9
The court explained that although the defendant's proffered reason for
firing the plaintiff was not credible, the plaintiff failed to carry his ulti-
mate burden of proving race was the reason he was terminated. 30 The
Eighth Circuit reversed, holding that as soon as the employee proved all
of the employer's proffered reasons for the adverse action were pretex-
tual, the employee was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. 31 The
Supreme Court, however, disagreed with the Eighth Circuit's conclusion,
explaining "nothing in law would permit us to substitute for the required
finding that the employer's action was the product of unlawful discrimi-
nation, the much different (and much lesser) finding that the employer's
explanation of its action was not believable." 32 At the pretext stage,
therefore, a court should analyze the evidence under an ordinary suffi-
27. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
28. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
29. Id. at 505.
30. Id. at 508.
31. Id. at 508-09.
32. Id. at 514-15.
2008]
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ciency of the evidence standard and determine whether the plaintiff satis-
fied his burden of showing evidence of intentional discrimination.
b. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.
33
The Court reinforced this view several years later in Reeves v. San-
derson Plumbing Products, Inc. In Reeves, the jury concluded the de-
fendant violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
when it fired the plaintiff.34 The district court denied the defendant's
motion for a directed verdict, and the defendant appealed.35 The Fifth
Circuit reversed, holding that evidence satisfying the plaintiff's prima
facie case plus evidence that the defendant's proffered reason was not
credible was not sufficient to prove intentional discrimination.36
The Supreme Court rejected the Fifth Circuit's conclusion, holding
that "a plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence to
find that the employer's asserted justification is false, may permit the
trier of fact to conclude that the employer unlawfully discriminated.
37
In reaching this decision, the Court once again strongly implied that at
the pretext stage of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, a court should
evaluate the plaintiff's evidence of intentional discrimination no differ-
ently than it would evaluate evidence under a traditional sufficiency of
the evidence standard.38 The Court explained, for example:
In appropriate circumstances, the trier of fact can reasonably infer
from the falsity of the explanation that the employer is dissembling to
cover up a discriminatory purpose. Such an inference is consistent
with the general principle of evidence law that the factfmder is enti-
tled to consider a party's dishonesty about a material fact as affirma-
tive evidence of guilt.
39
2. Limiting the Relevancy and Applicability of the McDonnell
Douglas Framework
In a series of four cases, the Court substantially limited the rele-
vancy and applicability of the McDonnell Douglas framework.
a. United States Postal Service Board v. Aikens
40
In United States Postal Service Board v. Aikens, the plaintiff filed
suit under Title VII, alleging his employer discriminated against him on
account of his race by refusing to promote him.4 1 After a bench trial, the
33. 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
34. Id. at 138-39.
35. Id. at 139.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 148.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 147 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).
40. 460 U.S. 711 (1983).
41. Id. at 712-13.
[Vol. 85:3
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district court entered judgment in favor of the employer, holding the
plaintiff failed to prove a prima facie case of discrimination. 42 The Su-
preme Court concluded the court erred in granting the defendant judg-
ment on this basis. It explained, "[w]here the defendant has done every-
thing that would be required of him if the plaintiff had properly made out
a prima facie case, whether the plaintiff really did so is no longer rele-
vant."
43
Aikens implies that as long as the defendant satisfied its burden of
producing evidence of a non-discriminatory reason for its employment
action, the court should evaluate the plaintiff's evidence under a tradi-
tional sufficiency of the evidence standard. 44 In essence, Aikens makes
the McDonnell Douglas framework irrelevant at the directed verdict
stage of a trial because "the employer will present evidence of a proper
motive in almost every case."45 To the extent that McDonnell Douglas
still matters, it only affects how judges evaluate motions for summary
judgment. 46
b. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston
47
The Supreme Court further limited the applicability of the McDon-
nell Douglas framework in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston. The
Court held the burden-shifting framework "is inapplicable where the
plaintiff presents direct evidence of discrimination."48  In Thurston, the
plaintiffs alleged the employer violated the ADEA by implementing a
system that forced airline pilots to either retire by age sixty or obtain
employment as a flight engineer through a bidding procedure.4 9 Because
the retirement system itself constituted direct evidence of age discrimina-
tion, the Court concluded the district court erred in evaluating the evi-
dence under the McDonnell Douglas test.50  The tripartite scheme was
designed for claims based on indirect evidence alone.
42. Id. at 713.
43. Id. at 715.
44. Id. at 715-16 ("On the state of the record at the close of the evidence, the District Court in
this case should have proceeded to this specific question directly, just as district courts decide dis-
puted questions of fact in other civil litigation."); see also id. at 716 ("[N]one of this means that trial
courts or reviewing courts should treat discrimination differently from other ultimate questions of
fact. Nor should they make their inquiry even more difficult by applying legal rules which were
devised to govern the allocation of burdens and order of presentation of proof .... (internal quota-
tion marks omitted)).
45. Wells v. Colo. Dep't of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1226 (10th Cir. 2003) (Hartz, J., concur-
ring).
46. Id. at 1226-27.
47. 469 U.S. 111 (1985).
48. Id. at 121.
49. Id. at 116-18.
50. Id. at 118, 121.
2008]
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c. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins5'
In Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court further limited
the applicability of the McDonnell Douglas framework by concluding it
does not apply in mixed motive Title VII cases.52 A mixed motive case
involves evidence showing that an employment decision was made based
on both legitimate and illegitimate considerations.53 In contrast, in a
pretext case, the plaintiff alleges a prohibited consideration was the sole
cause of the employment action, and the employer's proffered reasons
were merely pretextual.54
In Price Waterhouse, partners in a professional accounting firm
proposed a female candidate for partnership." After deliberation and a
vote, the partners ultimately decided to hold her candidacy for reconsid-
eration.56 When the partners refused to repropose her for partnership, she
sued the firm, alleging sexual discrimination in violation of Title VII.
The district court concluded the partners had legitimate concerns about
the candidate's interpersonal skills, and these concerns did not serve as a
pretext for discrimination.57 At the same time, the court decided the firm
still violated Title VII because certain sexist remarks made by the part-
ners indicated discrimination played a role in the decision.58 The D.C.
Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.59
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made it an "unlawful em-
ployment practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any indi-
vidual ... because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin."60 In interpreting this language, Justice Brennan's plurality
opinion,6' Justice White's concurring opinion, and Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion all agreed the statute permitted courts to hold em-
ployers liable for employment decisions based on both permitted and
prohibited considerations.6' They also agreed courts should not apply the
McDonnell Douglas framework when evaluating such cases.63 A new
framework was needed. Within the scope of that new framework, if the
employee met the initial burden of proof, an employer could still avoid
51. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
52. Id. at 245-47 (Brennan, J., plurality); id. at 260 (White, J., concurring); id. at 270
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 246-47 (Brennan, J., plurality); id. at 260 (White, J., concurring).
54. Id. at 260 (White, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 233 (Brennan, J., plurality).
56. See id. at 232-33.
57. Id. at 231-32, 236.
58. Id. at 236-37.
59. Id. at 232.
60. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2006).
61. Justice Brennan's plurality opinion was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Ste-
vens.
62. Hopkins, 490 U.S. at 240 (Brennan, J., plurality); id. at 259-60 (White, J., concurring); id.
at 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
63. Id. at 246-47 (Brennan, J., plurality); id. at 260 (White, J., concurring).
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liability if it proved by a preponderance of evidence that it would have
made the same decision even if it had not taken the prohibited considera-
tion into account.
64
Justices Brennan, White, and O'Connor disagreed, however, about
what constituted the plaintiffs initial burden of proof. Justice Brennan
explained the plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence
that a prohibited characteristic played a motivating part in the employ-
ment decision.65  Justice White required the plaintiff to show that the
66unlawful motive was a substantial factor in the adverse employment.
Finally, Justice O'Connor argued the plaintiff must prove by "direct evi-
dence ... an illegitimate criterion was a substantial factor in the deci-
sion.' ,67 In subsequent cases, several circuits, 68 including the Tenth Cir-
cuit,69 followed Justice O'Connor's approach and required plaintiffs to
produce direct evidence of discrimination in order to establish liability
under a mixed motive theory.
d. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa
70
After Price Waterhouse, few plaintiffs pursued claims under the
mixed motive framework because most circuits concluded direct evi-
dence was necessary to prove liability under that theory. Because most
employment discrimination cases involve only circumstantial evidence,
the McDonnell Douglas framework continued to be the dominant
framework courts used to determine whether the plaintiff's Title VII
claims survived summary judgment.7' Partly in response to the Price
Waterhouse decision,72 Congress amended Title VII when it enacted the
Civil Rights Act of 1991. The new statutory language clarified that "an
unlawful employment practice is established when the complaining party
demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a moti-
vating factor for any employment practice, even though other factors
also motivated the practice.
73
64. Id. at 244-45 (Brennan, J., plurality); id. at 261 (White, J., concurring); id at 270
(O'Connor, J., concurring).
65. Id. at 244-45 (Brennan, J., plurality).
66. Id. at 259 (White, J., concurring).
67. Id. at 276 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
68. See, e.g., Mohr v. Dustrol, Inc., 306 F.3d 636, 640-41 (8th Cir. 2002); Fernandes v. Costa
Bros. Masonry, Inc., 199 F.3d 572, 580 (1st Cit. 1999); Trotter v. Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala., 91
F.3d 1449, 1453-54 (11 th Cit. 1996); Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137, 1142 (4th Cit. 1995).
69. See, e.g., EEOC v. Witel, Inc., 81 F.3d 1508, 1514 (10th Cir. 1996); Heim v. Utah, 8 F.3d
1541, 1546-47 (10th Cit. 1993).
70. 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
71. See Carey v. FedEx Ground Package Sys., 321 F. Supp. 2d 902, 915 (S.D. Ohio 2004).
72. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. at 94.
73. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006) (emphasis added). The 1991 Act also altered the em-
ployer's affirmative defense. Under the Price Waterhouse framework, an employer does not violate
Title VII if the employer can satisfy its burden of persuasion. Under the 1991 Act, however the
employer still violates Title VII if the employer proves it would have made the same decision in the
absence of the protected characteristic. Under such circumstances, the plaintiff could obtain declara-
20081
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In Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,74 the Supreme Court interpreted the
meaning of this new language in an opinion that could dramatically in-
crease the number of cases that are analyzed under the mixed motive
framework and decrease the number of cases examined under the
McDonnell Douglas framework. The potential implications of this case
will be further explored below."
B. Tenth Circuit Case Law on Pretext
To prove pretext in the Tenth Circuit, a plaintiff must produce evi-
dence of "such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, incoheren-
cies, or contradictions in the employer's proffered legitimate reasons for
its action that a reasonable fact finder could rationally find them unwor-
thy of credence and hence infer that the employer did not act for the as-
serted nondiscriminatory reasons., 76 Because this pretextual inquiry is
necessarily a motive inquiry, the court is expected to probe the mental
status of the decision maker involved. Thus, "[t]he relevant inquiry as to
a proffered reason's falsity 'is not whether the employer's proffered rea-
sons were wise, fair or correct, but whether it honestly believed those
reasons and acted in good faith upon those beliefs.'"77
Tenth Circuit cases also address the typical situation where the em-
ployer has proffered multiple nondiscriminatory reasons for its employ-
ment decision. The general rule in these cases is an employee "must
proffer evidence that shows each of the employer's justifications is pre-
textual. 78 But this general rule is subject to numerous qualifications. If
the plaintiff "casts substantial doubt on many of the employer's multiple
reasons," for example, then summary judgment is not appropriate and the
case should go to the fact finder.79 Moreover, if one of the employer's
stated reasons for its action predominates over the others, "demonstrating
that reason to be pretextual is enough to avoid summary judgment.
8 0
1. Evidence Generally Used to Prove Pretext
As the case law surrounding pretext has developed, the Tenth Cir-
cuit determined certain types of evidence were sufficient to show pretext
in individual cases. Subsequent plaintiffs often try to shoe-horn the evi-
tory relief, injunctive relief, and attorney's fees. The plaintiff, however, could not obtain damages.
See id. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
74. Desert Palace, 539 U.S. 90.
75. See infra Part II.C.
76. Argo v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Kan., 452 F.3d 1193, 1203 (10th Cir. 2006); Bryant
v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 432 F.3d 1114, 1125 (10th Cir. 2005); Morgan v. Hilti, Inc., 108 F.3d 1319,
1323 (10th Cir. 1997).
77. Nguyen v. Gambro BCT, Inc., 242 F. App'x 483, 489 (10th Cir. 2007) (quoting Rivera v.
City and County of Denver, 365 F.3d 912, 924-25 (10th Cir. 2004)).
78. Tyler v. RE/MAX Mountain States, Inc., 232 F.3d 808, 814 (10th Cir. 2000).
79. Id.
80. Bryant, 432 F.3d at 1127; accord Jaramillo v. Colo. Judicial Dep't, 427 F.3d 1303, 1310
(10th Cir. 2005).
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dence they have of pretext into these talismanic categories. Although
these categories are found neither in Congress's statutory language nor in
the Supreme Court's relevant case law, plaintiffs continue to invoke
them to make their required showing of pretext. The most common
categories of evidence are the following:
General Bias. Evidence in this category tends to show various su-
pervisors of the employer harbored discriminatory animus toward indi-
viduals in the plaintiffs protected class. For example, there may be a
"pattern and practice" of failing to promote employees of a certain
status,8 ' a "long history" of discriminatory conduct,82 or a "culture of
racial hostility., 83  Because it is so generalized, this type of evidence,
standing alone, rarely suffices to show pretext. 84 The plaintiff must show
"the alleged general discriminatory animus on the part of the employer
played a direct role in the adverse employment decision in the plaintiffs
case." 85 .' [S]ome nexus between the circumstantial evidence of general
bias and the decision to terminate is required."'
86
Disparate Treatment / Prior Treatment of Plaintiff Adverse em-
ployment actions or generally bad treatment of the plaintiff may, in some
cases, lead to an inference of discrimination. 87 For example, being disci-
plined for reading on the job-while other similarly-situated employees
not in a protected class were not-may point toward discrimination in a
later adverse employment decision.88 "A plaintiff seeking to show pre-
text often does so by providing evidence that he was treated differently
from other similarly-situated employees who violated work rules of
comparable seriousness., 89 "Similarly situated employees are those who
deal with the same supervisor and are subject to the same standards gov-
erning performance evaluation and discipline." 90 This "same-supervisor
81. See generally Ortiz v. Norton, 254 F.3d 889, 896 (10th Cir. 2001) (explaining the type of
evidence a plaintiff should produce to show that the defendant's reason for its actions is "merely
pretext").
82. See generally Pippin v. Burlington Res. Oil and Gas Co., 440 F.3d 1186, 1197 (10th Cir.
2006) (explaining that the court can infer discrimination from a plaintiff's showing of such regular
conduct on the part of the defendant).
83. See generally English v. Colo. Dep't of Corr., 248 F.3d 1002, 1010 (10th Cir. 2001)
(explaining that in order to show a "culture of racial hostility" the plaintiff must show some connec-
tion between the culture of hostility evidence and the defendant's decision to terminate the plaintiff).
84. See Bullington v. United Air Lines, 186 F.3d 1301, 1319 (10th Cir. 1999).
85. Timmerman v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 483 F.3d 1106, 1118 (10th Cir. 2007).
86. Id. at 1117-18 (quoting English, 248 F.3d at 1010).
87. See Mohammed v. Callaway, 698 F.2d 395, 399 (10th Cir. 1983) (citing McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973) (noting that the employer's treatment of the
employee during his term of employment is relevant to the employee's showing of pretext)).
88. Cf Simms v. Oklahoma ex rel. Dep't of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Servs., 165
F.3d 1321, 1331 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting this type of behavior may demonstrate pretext in some
cases, but not where the incident occurs "years before" the employment decision challenged).
89. Timmerman, 483 F.3d at 1120 (quoting Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Serv. Inc., 220 F.3d
1220, 1230 (10th Cir. 2000)).
90. Id. (quoting Aramburu v. Boeing Co., 112 F.3d 1398, 1404 (10th Cir. 1997)).
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rule" does not apply when the plaintiff alleges a company-wide discrimi-
natory reduction in force ("RIF"). 91
Statistical Evidence. "It is uniformly recognized that statistical data
showing an employer's pattern of conduct toward a protected class can
create an inference that an employer discriminated against individual
members of the class. 92 At the same time, "[s]tatistics taken in isolation
are generally not probative of... discrimination. ' The usefulness of
statistics depends on their relevance to the individual plaintiffs case.
"[A] plaintiffs statistical evidence must focus on eliminating nondis-
criminatory explanations for the disparate treatment by showing dispa-
rate treatment between comparable individuals."
94
Disturbing Procedural Irregularities / Company Policy. Evidence
of pretext can be shown if the defendant acted contrary to a written com-
pany policy or an unwritten policy or practice.95 The alleged irregularity
must have disadvantaged members of the protected class alone, rather
than all employees. 96 "[D]isturbing procedural irregularities surrounding
an adverse employment action may demonstrate that an employer's prof-
fered nondiscriminatory business reason is pretextual. ' '97  Courts may
infer pretext from procedural irregularities for the simple reason that the
employer may have concocted different policies for the sole purpose of
discriminating against the plaintiff.
Use of Subjective Criteria. The Tenth Circuit has held, "the pres-
ence of subjective decision-making can create a strong inference of dis-
crimination .... 98 "The use of such subjective criteria as 'dedication'
and 'enthusiasm' also 'may offer a convenient pretext for giving force
and effect to ... prejudice."'9 9 Because the court evaluates whether sub-
jective criteria were used in the employment decision in an objective,
91. Mendelsohn v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 466 F.3d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 2006); see also
Metzler v. Fed. Home Loan Bank of Topeka, 464 F.3d 1164, 1175 (10th Cir. 2006); EEOC v.
PVNF, L.L.C., 487 F.3d 790, 805 (10th Cir. 2007).
92. Fallis v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 944 F.2d 743, 746 (10th Cir. 1991).
93. Jones v. Unisys Corp., 54 F.3d 624, 632 (10th Cir. 1995); see also Ortiz v. Norton, 254
F.3d 889, 896-97 (10th Cir. 2001).
94. Fallis, 944 F.2d at 746.
95. Kendrick v. Penske Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1230 (10th Cir. 2000); see also
Fallis, 944 F.2d at 747.
96. Kendrick, 220 F.3d at 1230 n.9 (quoting Randle v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 454 n.20
(10th Cir. 1995)).
97. Timmerman v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 483 F.3d 1106, 1122 (2007); see also Simms v. Okla-
homa ex rel. Dep't of Mental Health and Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d 1321, 1329 (finding no
procedural irregularities because defendant-employer's hiring actions were consistent with its pub-
lished policies); Doebele v. SprintlUnited Mgmt. Co., 342 F.3d 1117, 1138 n.1 1 (10th Cir. 2003).
98. Bauer v. Bailar, 647 F.2d 1037, 1045 (10th Cir. 1981).
99. Mohammed v. Callaway, 698 F.2d 395, 401 (10th Cir. 1983) (quoting Thornton v. Coffey,
618 F.2d 686, 691 (lOth Cir. 1980)).
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reasonable light, an employee's allegation of pretext based on a self-
assessment of his abilities is insufficient.'00
2. Evidence Used to Show Pretext in Reduction in Force Cases
The Tenth Circuit has treated allegations of pretext somewhat dif-
ferently in RIF cases. In a RIF case, a plaintiff can demonstrate pretext
in three main ways: (1) plaintiff's termination does not accord with the
RIF criteria; (2) defendant's RIF criteria were deliberately falsified or
manipulated in order to terminate plaintiff; or (3) the RIF was generally
pretextual.' 0°
The third category generates the most heated disagreements because
it is the most open-ended. A RIF can be deemed generally pretextual in
various ways. First, the RIF is likely pretextual if the employer actively
sought to replace RIF-terminated employees with new hires during the
RIF general time frame. 10 2 Although "leaving out new employees from
RIF decisions does not establish pretext," hiring new ones does.1
0 3
Second, the RIF is likely pretextual if the employer evaluates and
ranks employees using "wholly subjective" criteria.1 4 As with evidence
of subjective criteria more generally, however, "[t]he subjective nature of
the evaluations may be a factor to consider in pretext but it ordinarily is
not by itself sufficient to establish pretext.''
0 5
Third, an employee may establish pretext by showing his or her job
was not in fact eliminated in the RIF.10 6 "Where an employee is selected
for RIF termination solely on the basis of position elimination, qualifica-
tions become irrelevant and one way that employee can show pretext is
to present evidence that his job was not in fact eliminated but instead
remained a single, distinct position."'
10 7
3. Evidence of Pretext Must be Linked to the Decision Maker
Despite the various pretext categories crafted by the Tenth Circuit,
there must be some evidence the decision maker had a discriminatory
intent. To make out a claim of employment discrimination, there must
100. See Simms, 165 F.3d at 1329 ("[A]n employee's own opinions about his qualifications do
not give rise to a material factual dispute.") (quoting Rabinovitz v. Pena, 89 F.3d 482, 487 (7th Cir.
1996)).
101. See, e.g., Beaird v. Seagate Tech., 145 F.3d 1159, 1168 (10th Cir. 1998).
102. Id.; Pippin v. Burlington Res. Oil & Gas Co., 440 F.3d 1186, 1193 (1Oth Cir. 2006).
103. Pippin, 440 F.3d at 1194; Fallis v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 944 F.2d 743, 745 (10th Cir.
1991).
104. Pippin, 440 F.3d at 1195 (citing Garrett v. Hewlett-Packard Co., 305 F.3d 1210, 1218
(10th Cir. 2002)).
105. Id.; see also Furr v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 82 F.3d 980, 987 (1996); Simms, 165 F.3d at
1328.
106. Pippin, 440 F.3d at 1194 (internal quotation marks omitted).
107. Id.
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be some nexus between the decision maker's unlawful discrimination
and the employment decision.1
0 8
In Belcher v. Boeing,l0 9 for example, the plaintiff failed to establish
a case of race discrimination where the defendant responsible for plain-
tiff's termination did not know plaintiff was African-American.1 0  The
court held, "the inference of discrimination does not make sense when
the decision maker is unaware of the employe[e]'s membership in a pro-
tected class.""' In two alleged retaliation cases, the plaintiffs could not
make out a case because the decision maker never knew of the protected
conduct. 1 2  In Henderson v. Echostar,113 the court held plaintiff had
failed in his case of disability discrimination, because it was undisputed
the employer "was not made aware of any such impairments until after
[plaintiff] was fired."' 1' 4 In Rakity v. Dillon Cos.,' 1 5 the court held that
whether one supervisor may have considered plaintiff disabled was im-
material in light of the undisputed fact that a different supervisor was
responsible for the adverse employment action.1 6  Thus, despite the
categorical label placed on a plaintiffs evidence of pretext, the plaintiff
must link up the evidence with an intent to discriminate on behalf of the
decision maker."l
7
C. Other Circuits' Case Law on Pretext
1. Evidence Generally Used to Show Pretext
Other courts of appeals have adopted categories of pretext evidence
similar to those used by the Tenth Circuit. Sometimes the formulation of
the category is slightly different, but often the exact phrases are used.
Thus, it is obvious the courts of appeals are looking to each other to fig-
108. Cf Mendelsohn v. Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 466 F.3d 1223, 1233 (10th Cir. 2006)
(Tymkovich, J., dissenting) ("Even taking as true [plaintiff's] assertion that these witnesses would
provide credible evidence that managers other than [the decision maker in this case] were motivated
by discriminatory animus, this does not in and of itself support the conclusion that [decision maker]
was so motivated."). The Supreme Court recently heard oral argument in Mendelsohn on the issue
of whether a district court must admit testimony by nonparties alleging discrimination by company
managers not involved in the adverse employment action at issue (i.e., "me too" evidence).
109. 105 F. App'x 222 (10th Cir. 2004).
110. Id. at 227.
111. Id. at 226.
112. Jones v. Barnhart, 349 F.3d 1260, 1269-70 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding that where decision
maker was unaware of plaintiff's outspokenness, plaintiff failed to establish causation requirement
for retaliation claim); Williams v. Rice, 983 F.2d 177, 181 (10th Cir. 1993) (noting "the supervisor
who made the decision to remove Plaintiff[] was not aware that Plaintiff had filed any EEO com-
plaints").
113. 172 F. App'x 892 (10th Cir. 2006).
114. ld. at 895.
115. 302 F.3d 1152 (10th Cir. 2002).
116. Id. at 1163.
117. The only possible exception to this rule is referred to as a "cat's paw" or "rubber stamp"
decision making process. In those situations, a biased subordinate lacking decision-making power
uses the formal decision maker to trigger a discriminatory employment action. See, e.g., E.E.O.C. v.
BCI Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of Los Angeles, 450 F.3d 476, 484-89 (10th Cir. 2006) (describing the
theory behind liability in "cat's paw" situations).
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ure out how to conduct the pretext analysis as set forth in McDonnell
Douglas. Although this helps ensure some level of consistency across
the country, the focus is misplaced: The courts should instead focus on
the issue of the employer's discriminatory motives. Tenth Circuit cate-
gories used in other circuits include:
General Bias. Many circuits also cognize a category of general bias,
including the Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits.
118
Disparate Treatment / Prior Treatment of Plaintiff Every court of
appeals recognizes that disparate treatment or prior bad treatment of
plaintiff may give rise to an inference of pretext on the part of the de-
fendant-employer. 1
19
Statistical Evidence. At least the Second, Fifth, Seventh, Ninth, and
D.C. Circuits recognize statistical evidence may be used by a plaintiff
to prove pretext.
20
Disturbing Procedural Irregularities / Failure to Follow Company
Policy. Most circuits, including the Second, Eighth, and D.C. Cir-
cuits, have held a plaintiff may demonstrate pretext by showing the
employer's employment decision was filled with disturbing proce-
dural irregularities or the employer failed to follow company poli-
cies.
12 1
Use of Subjective Criteria. The Fifth Circuit agrees with the Tenth
that use of subjective criteria in making an employment decision can
lead to an inference of discrimination.1
22
In addition to the categories used by the Tenth Circuit, other circuits
have fashioned additional categories of evidence that plaintiffs can use to
show pretext. These categories include:
118. Anderson v. Douglas & Lomason Co., 26 F.3d 1277, 1295 (5th Cir. 1994); Hernandez v.
HCH Miller Park Joint Venture, 418 F.3d 732, 736 (7th Cir. 2005); Vaughn v. Roadway Express,
Inc., 164 F.3d 1087, 1091 (8th Cir. 1998); Diaz v. AT&T, 752 F.2d 1356, 1364 (9th Cir. 1985).
119. Nasti v. CIBA Specialty Chems. Corp., 492 F.3d 589, 593 (5th Cir. 2007); Boumehdi v.
Plastag Holdings, LLC, 489 F.3d 781, 790-92 (7th Cir. 2007); McClain v. NorthWest Comm. Cor-
rections Ctr. Judicial Corr. Bd., 440 F.3d 320, 334 (6th Cir. 2006); 2922 Sherman Ave. Tenants'
Assoc. v. Dist. of Columbia, 444 F.3d 673, 684 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Rodgers v. U.S. Bank, N.A., 417
F.3d 845, 853 (8th Cir. 2005); Raad v. Fairbanks North Star Borough Sch. Dist., 323 F.3d 1185,
1192-95 (9th Cir. 2003) (prior treatment of plaintiff); Che v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 342 F.3d 31,
39 (1st Cir. 2003); Graham v. Long Island R.R., 230 F.3d 34, 43 (2d Cir. 2000); Hughes v. Bedsole,
48 F.3d 1376, 1384-85 (4th Cir. 1995); Richardson v. Leeds Police Dept., 71 F.3d 801, 805-07 (11 th
Cir. 1995); Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr & Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 538 (3d Cir. 1992).
120. Fisher v. Vassar College, 70 F.3d 1420, 1442 (2d Cir. 1995); Anderson, 26 F.3d at 1290;
Mister v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 832 F.2d 1427, 1435 (7th Cir. 1987); Noyes v. Kelly Servs., 488
F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2007); Krodel v. Young, 748 F.2d 701, 710 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
121. Greenway v. Buffalo Hilton Hotel, 143 F.3d 47, 51 (2d Cir. 1998); Ledbetter v. Alltel
Corporate Servs., Inc., 437 F.3d 717, 722 (8th Cir. 2006); Krodel, 748 F.2d at 711.
122. Payne v. Travenol Labs, Inc., 673 F.2d 798, 827 (5th Cir. 1982).
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Anecdotes or Anecdotal Evidence. The Second, Fifth, and D.C. Cir-
cuits have a category called anecdotal evidence that can be used to
show pretext. 123
Qualifications Jump off the Page and Slap You in the Face. The
Fifth and Eleventh Circuits have adopted a standard whereby an em-
ployee may make out a case of pretext by showing an individual who
was hired instead of the aggrieved plaintiff was obviously not as
qualified. 124
Substantial Changes in Proffered Reason. The Fourth and Eighth
Circuits allow an inference of pretext where the employer has made
substantial changes over time in its proffered reason for an employ-
ment decision.
125
2. Evidence Must be Linked to the Decision Maker
Most circuits agree with the Tenth Circuit that the decision maker
must know about the employee's protected status for the employee to
make out a case of employment discrimination. 126  This accords with
Supreme Court precedent.' 27 In Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez,128 for ex-
ample, the Court ruled in favor of the defendant as a matter of law where
the decision maker did not know of the plaintiff-employee's protected
status. The Court held, "If [the decision maker] were truly unaware that
such a disability existed, it would be impossible for her hiring decision to
have been based, even in part, on [plaintiffs] disability.'
129
In sum, the courts of appeals have adopted various categories of
evidence into which prospective plaintiffs try to fit their claims of pre-
text. This accords with the practice in the Tenth Circuit. The problem
123. Fisher, 70 F.3d at 1438-39; Anderson, 26 F.3d at 1289-90, 1294; Krodel, 748 F.2d at 710-
11.
124. Lee v. GTE Florida, Inc., 226 F.3d 1249, 1254 (11 th Cir. 2000); Deines v. Tex. Dept. of
Protective and Regulatory Servs., 164 F.3d 277, 280 (5th Cir. 1999). But see Road, 323 F.3d at 1194
("We have never followed the Fifth Circuit in holding that the disparity in candidates' qualifications
must be so apparent as to jump off the page and slap us in the face to support a finding of pretext.")
(internal marks omitted). The Ninth Circuit has adopted a formulation where the aggrieved plain-
tiffs qualifications need only be "clearly superior." Id.
125. E.E.O.C. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 243 F.3d 846, 852-53 (4th Cir. 2001); Kobrin v. Univ.
of Minn., 34 F.3d 698, 703 (8th Cir. 1994).
126. See, e.g., Schreiner v. Caterpillar, Inc., 250 F.3d 1096, 1099 (7th Cir. 2001) (holding
sexist comments "are relevant only when attributable to the person who made the adverse employ-
ment decision"); Holland v. Washington Homes, Inc., 487 F.3d 208, 217 (4th Cir. 2007)
("[U]ltimately, it is the perception of the decisionmaker which is relevant."); Medina-Munoz v. R.J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co., 896 F.2d 5, 10 (1st Cir. 1990) ("The biases of one who neither makes nor
influences the challenged personnel decision are not probative in an employment discrimination
case.").
127. As noted supra note 108, the Supreme Court recently heard oral arguments in
Sprint/United Management Co. v. Mendelsohn, which also concerns the relevance of evidence of
discriminatory animus harbored by non-decision makers. See Transcript of Oral Argument, 128 S.
Ct. 435 (2007).
128. 540 U.S. 44 (2003).
129. Id. at 55 n.7.
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with this approach is that the categories of pretextual evidence divert the
attention of judges and juries away from the ultimate issue in every case:
whether the adverse employment decision resulted from the employer's
unlawful discrimination.
II. PROBLEMS WITH MCDONNELL DOUGLAS
Several problems arise out of the McDonnell Douglas framework.
A thoughtful concurrence in Wells v. Colorado Department of Transpor-
tation highlights some of them. 30  First, the compartmentalization of
evidence causes courts to put on blinders, looking at categories of evi-
dence narrowly while the totality of the evidence may point to discrimi-
nation. 131 Second, the framework creates an artificial distinction between
direct and circumstantial evidence. 132 Third, the three-part test emptied
the field of other equally plausible ways of examining evidence, ways
that might not fit in the formalistic categories established by the Supreme
Court. 33 Finally, the courts are confused about what McDonnell Doug-
las means for cases that go to the jury. In this Part, I will further describe
these problems, as well as other conundrums.
A. Over-Compartmentalization of Evidence
The tripartite scheme leads factfinders (or more precisely courts
considering motions for summary judgment) to (unwittingly) over-
compartmentalize evidence. In Reeves, the Supreme Court suggested
that the Fifth Circuit erred by "ignor[ing] the evidence supporting peti-
tioner's prima facie case" in reviewing whether there was discrimination
during the pretext stage of analysis. 134  Reeves rebuked over-
compartmentalization of the evidence in the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work when it noted "the trier of fact may still consider the evidence es-
tablishing the plaintiffs prima facie case and inferences properly drawn
therefrom... on the issue of whether the defendant's explanation is pre-
textual."'
1 35
130. Wells v. Colo. Dep't of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1221-28 (10th Cir. 2003) (Hartz, J.,
concurring); see also Zamora v. Elite Logistics, Inc., 478 F.3d 1160, 1167 (10th Cir. 2007) (Hartz,
J., concurring, joined by Tymkovich, J.) ("I continue to believe that we should not apply the frame-
work of McDonnell Douglas ... to review a summary judgment when the existence of a prima facie
case is not disputed.... Applying that framework is inconsistent with Supreme Court authority,
adds unnecessary complexity to the analysis, and is too likely to cause us to reach a result contrary to
what we would decide if we focused on the ultimate question of discrimination vel non.") (internal
quotation marks omitted).
131. Wells, 325 F.3d at 1221-28.
132. Id. at 1225.
133. Id. at 1224.
134. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 530 U.S. 133, 146 (2000).
135. Id. at 143 (internal citations and quotations omitted); see also Vasquez v. County of Los
Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 649 (9th Cir. 2003) (Ferguson, J., dissenting) ("The trier of fact may con-
sider the same evidence that the plaintiff has introduced to establish a primafacie case in determin-
ing whether the defendant's explanation for the employment decision is pretextual.") (quoting Lowe
v. Monrovia, 775 F.2d 998, 1008 (9th Cir. 1985)).
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In Reeves, the Supreme Court chastised the Fifth Circuit for failing
to consider all the evidence of discrimination. In reversing the jury's
verdict in favor of the employee, the court of appeals "ignored the evi-
dence supporting petitioner's prima facie case and challenging respon-
dent's explanation for its decision." 136  The Fifth Circuit thought the
plaintiff's prima facie case, combined with sufficient evidence for the
trier of fact to disbelieve the defendant's legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for its decision, was nevertheless insufficient as a matter of law to
sustain a jury's verdict in favor of plaintiff.13 7  The Supreme Court
thought otherwise. It held, "In appropriate circumstances, the trier of
fact can reasonably infer from the falsity of the explanation that the em-
ployer is dissembling to cover up a discriminatory purpose."'
138
In Hicks, decided seven years earlier, the Supreme Court had al-
ready warned against over-compartmentalization of evidence. The Court
made clear the factfinder's rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons
permits the trier of fact to infer the employer discriminated, but does not
require such an inference.' 39 The Court held, "the Court of Appeals'
holding that rejection of the defendant's proffered reasons compels
judgment for the plaintiff disregards the fundamental principle of Rule
301 that a presumption does not shift the burden of proof, and ignores
our repeated admonition that the Title VII plaintiff at all times bears the
'ultimate burden of [persuasion].'"140
Despite the Court's repeated warnings against over-
compartmentalization of evidence, there is widespread evidence it still
plagues the lower courts today. A case from the Northern District of
Illinois typifies the problem. In Jarosz v. Seko Air Freight, Inc., the
plaintiff alleged discrimination on the basis of her gender.' 4' The em-
ployer's defense was that it fired plaintiff because she was improperly
maintaining relationships with defendant's competitors in violation of
company policy. In applying the McDonnell Douglas framework, the
court decided some of the employer's evidence could not be introduced
to rebut plaintiffs showing of a prima facie case, but instead had to wait
until the employer was obliged to offer a legitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for the employment action. The court ruled, "Defendant's allega-
tion that Plaintiff defied Defendant's orders . . .is more appropriately
introduced as a legitimate reason for terminating Plaintiff rather than as
136. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 146 (citing Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., 197 F.3d 688, 693-
94 (5th Cir. 1999)).
137. Reeves, 197 F.3d at 693.
138. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147.
139. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993).
140. Id. (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 716 (1983)); see
also Deborah C. Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV.
2229, 2282-90 (1995).
141. Jarosz v. Seko Air Freight, Inc., No. 92-7246, 1994 WL 11649 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 6, 1994).
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evidence that Plaintiff was not meeting Defendant's reasonable perform-
ance expectations."'
142
By dividing the presentation of the evidence into three stages, the
ultimate fact of discrimination can easily become lost. Courts are overly
concerned with fitting the evidence available in a particular case into
artificial categories of "prima facie case," "legitimate, non-
discriminatory reason," and "pretext." Instead, they should be focused
on gathering all evidence tending to show the defendant-employer dis-
criminated.
B. Direct Versus Circumstantial Evidence
Another fundamental problem with the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work is the artificial distinction it creates between direct and circumstan-
tial evidence. Under existing doctrine, courts need to classify evidence
as either direct or indirect because the type of evidence produced by the
plaintiff determines whether the courts should apply the McDonnell
Douglas framework. In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Thurston,143 the
Supreme Court held courts do not need to apply the McDonnell Douglas
framework in an ADEA case if the plaintiff produces direct evidence. At
least prior to the Desert Palace decision, a plaintiff also needed to pro-
duce direct evidence in order to pursue a case under a mixed motive the-
ory.
144
Frequently it is difficult to classify evidence as direct or circumstan-
tial. Judge Hartz in a concurring opinion in Wells v. Colorado Depart-
ment of Transportation145 thoughtfully addresses this conundrum. The
appeal involved a claim of retaliation arising from complaints of gender
discrimination. In evaluating the evidence produced at the summary
judgment stage, the concurrence observed:
In this case, for example, would testimony that Mr. Moston called
Plaintiff's lawsuit a "firivolous ... pain in the ass" be direct evidence
of discrimination? If the evidence is "direct evidence," must we then
abandon the McDonnell Douglas framework in our review of the
case? If it is not "direct evidence," how does it fit within the McDon-
nell Douglas framework?
146
Another problem with the direct and indirect evidence dichotomy is
that it is based on the assumption that direct evidence is inherently more
reliable than circumstantial evidence. But "[t]he authorities are legion
that circumstantial evidence can be every bit as compelling as direct evi-
142. Id. at *4.
143. 469 U.S. 111, 121 (1985).
144. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 276 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
145. 325 F.3d 1205 (10th Cir. 2003).
146. Id. at 1225 (Hartz, J., concurring).
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dence."'147  Often the direct evidence of a positive eyewitness can be
quite undone by contradictory circumstantial evidence.
Finally, this inquiry distracts the court from what it should be focus-
ing its attention on: determining whether the plaintiff produced suffi-
cient evidence of discrimination. As Judge Hartz observed in Wells:
I would have thought that by now the distinction between direct and
circumstantial evidence would have been disregarded in considering
the sufficiency of the evidence to support a claim. [This demon-
strates] how the use of the McDonnell Douglas framework so readily
lends itself to consideration of formalities instead of the essence of
the issue at hand.
1 48
C. Mixed-Motive Cases
Another problem is the artificial distinction between mixed motive
and single motive Title VII cases. As explained above, this distinction
was created by the Supreme Court in Price Waterhouse.149 Under a sin-
gle motive theory (i.e., McDonnell Douglas framework), a plaintiff ulti-
mately must prove that discrimination was the sole factor influencing the
employment decision, while under a mixed motive theory, a plaintiff
must merely show that discrimination was a motivating factor. Nothing
in the text of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, however, indicates that Con-
gress intended courts to maintain this dichotomy. The statute plainly
states, "an unlawful employment practice is established when the com-
plaining party demonstrates that race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin was a motivating factor for any employment practice, even though
other factors also motivated the practice."'50 In this Part, I will explain
why the Supreme Court's decision in Desert Palace creates additional
confusion about when courts should evaluate Title VII cases under the
mixed motive framework rather than the McDonnell Douglas formula.'
5'
1. Potential Implications of Desert Palace
In Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa,152 an employee sued her employer
under Title VII, alleging gender discrimination. The district court pro-
posed to give the jury the following mixed motive instruction:
147. Whittington v. Nordam Group Inc., 429 F.3d 986, 996 (10th Cir. 2005) (citing Rogers v.
Mo. Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 500, 508 n.17 (1957)); The Robert Edwards, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat) 187, 190
(1821); United States v. Becker, 62 F.2d 1007, 1010 (2d Cir. 1933); IA John Henry Wigmore,
EVIDENCE § 26 (Peter Tillers rev. 1983).
148. Wells, 325 F.3d at 1225 (Hartz, J., concurring).
149. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 241 (1989).
150. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2006).
151. At least one circuit has concluded Desert Palace also affects mixed motive claims that are
brought under statutes other than 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m). See, e.g., Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc.,
376 F.3d 305, 311-12 (5th Cir. 2004) (holding the Court's analysis of mixed motive Title VII cases
in Desert Palace is also applicable to ADEA claims).
152. 539 U.S. 90, 96 (2003).
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You have heard evidence that the defendant's treatment of the plain-
tiff was motivated by the plaintiff's sex and also by other lawful rea-
sons. If you find that the plaintiffs sex was a motivating factor in the
defendant's treatment of the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to your
verdict, even if you find that the defendant's conduct was also moti-
vated by a lawful reason.
However, if you find that the defendant's treatment of the plaintiff
was motivated by both gender and lawful reasons, you must decide
whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages. The plaintiff is entitled to
damages unless the defendant proves by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the defendant would have treated plaintiff similarly even if
the plaintiff's gender had played no role in the employment deci-
sion. 1
53
The employer objected, arguing the plaintiff was not entitled to such an
instruction because she had failed to produce any direct evidence of dis-
crimination.1 54  The district court rejected the objection, and the jury
found for the plaintiff.155 An en banc panel of the Ninth Circuit affirmed
the district court's judgment, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
156
In affirming the Ninth Circuit's judgment, the Supreme Court ex-
plained that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 clarified that a plaintiff pursu-
ing judgment under a mixed motive theory does not need to prove his
case using direct evidence. 57 Therefore, in order to obtain a mixed mo-
tive jury instruction, "a plaintiff need only present sufficient evidence for
a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the evidence, that [a
prohibited characteristic] was a motivating factor for any employment
practice."' 158 This holding implies courts should apply an ordinary suffi-
ciency of the evidence standard in determining whether the plaintiff has
satisfied the burden.
Although Desert Palace's opinion is about jury instructions, several
judges, 159 practitioners, 16 and scholars' 6 1 have suggested that the Su-
preme Court's elimination of the direct evidence requirement carries
153. Id. at 96-97.
154. Id. at 97.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 97-98.
157. Id. at 101-02.
158. Id. at 101.
159. See, e.g., Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 740 (8th Cir. 2004) (Magnuson, J.,
concurring).
160. See, e.g., Bettina Plevan et al., Summary Judgment in Employment Discrimination Cases
After Desert Palace, in 745 LITIGATION STRATEGY: PREPARING AND DEFENDING SUMMARY
JUDGMENT MOTIONs 815 (2006).
161. See generally T.L. Nagy, The Fall of the False Dichotomy: The Effect of Desert Palace v.
Costa on Summary Judgment in Title VII Discrimination Cases, 46 S. TEX. L. REv. 137 (2004); Van
Detta, supra note 16.
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over into the summary judgment context. 162 One judge went so far as to
claim 163 the Court's reasoning in Desert Palace should be extended to
the summary judgment context because the reasonable jury standard used
to determine whether the court should issue mixed motive jury instruc-
tions is the same as the standard used to determine whether the plaintiffs
claims survive summary judgment. 164
If plaintiffs no longer need to produce direct evidence to survive
summary judgment, potentially every Title VII case could be analyzed
under both the mixed motive approach and the McDonnell Douglas sin-
gle motive approach. 65 If both options are available to plaintiffs, most-
if not all-plaintiffs would likely choose the mixed motive theory. As
Judge Magnuson explains, "a plaintiff that prevails under either theory
obtains the same relief .... There is no need for a plaintiff to prove the
more onerous single-motive case, when all that Title VII requires a plain-
tiff to prove is that discrimination was a motivating factor in the em-
ployment decision." 66
Based on this reasoning, Judge Magnuson and others have sug-
gested Desert Palace makes the McDonnell Douglas framework essen-
tially irrelevant at the summary judgment stage of a Title VII case. They
suggest courts should instead simply apply a traditional sufficiency of the
evidence standard to determine whether unlawful discrimination was a
motivating factor in an employment decision, and whether the employer
can establish an affirmative defense.
1 67
162. See generally Plevan et al., supra note 160 (summarizing cases); Nagy, supra note 161;
Van Detta, supra note 16.
163. Griffith, 387 F.3d at 745 (Magnuson, J., concurring).
164. Judge Magnuson reasoned:
Although the context of the decision applied to jury instructions, the practical effect of
Desert Palace nonetheless affects the analysis used at summary judgment. The reason-
able jury standard is the same as the summary judgment standard: whether the plaintiff
has presented sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could logically infer that
the adverse employment action resulted from an improper consideration of a protected
characteristic. Moreover, there is no support for the proposition that the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 compels different analyses at different procedural stages of a Title VII case. Ap-
plying the more onerous McDonnell Douglas paradigm at summary judgment and then
applying the Civil Rights Act of 1991 at trial is inconsistent and impractical. This ap-
proach requires the plaintiff to prove at summary judgment that an invidious characteris-
tic was the but-for cause of the employment action, but then at trial only requires the
plaintiff to prove that this characteristic was a motivating factor in the employment deci-
sion. This inconsistency further interferes with the ultimate issue of whether there is any
evidence that supports a finding that discrimination motivated the employment decision.
It is absurd to require the plaintiff to satisfy a higher burden at summary judgment when
the lesser burden is all that is required under the statute.
Id. at 745 n.9.
165. Id. at 744 (Magnuson, J., concurring) ('[P]rinciples of statutory interpretation compel the
conclusion that Congress never envisioned a dichotomy between single and mixed-motive cases.").
166. Id. (Magnuson, J., concurring).
167. Id. at 747-48.
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2. Confusion in the Tenth Circuit and Other Circuits
Nonetheless, courts throughout the country have struggled to inter-
pret the meaning of the Desert Palace opinion. One cause of this confu-
sion is the fact that the Supreme Court, in a footnote, explicitly declined
to address the affect the case had on the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work. 68 In a subsequent opinion-Raytheon Co. v. Hernandez'69-the
Supreme Court applied the traditional McDonnell Douglas framework
and made absolutely no reference to the Desert Palace opinion. As
Judge Magnuson commented, "Just as the Supreme Court ignored
McDonnell Douglas in the Desert Palace opinion, the Supreme Court
likewise ignored Desert Palace in the Raytheon opinion. These inconsis-
tencies further demonstrate the confusion that McDonnell Douglas cre-
ates. 170
This confusion clearly manifests itself in the Tenth Circuit's post-
Desert Palace decisions. One unreported decision, analyzing the impact
Desert Palace had on summary judgment motions, held that a court may
apply the mixed motive framework even if the plaintiff only produced
circumstantial evidence of discrimination.' 7' A decision published the
same year, however, did not mention Desert Palace and suggested the
direct evidence requirement still existed.
72
Assuming plaintiffs are permitted to pursue a Title VII claim under
the mixed motive framework without direct evidence, it is unclear when
courts should apply the framework. In one unreported case, the em-
ployee argued the district court erred in only applying the traditional
McDonnell Douglas framework, and not the mixed motive analysis.
73
The panel declined to reach the issue because the plaintiff did not spe-
cifically raise the mixed motive theory before the district court.17 4 In a
different unreported case, the Tenth Circuit implied that the mere presen-
tation of evidence of a mixed motive triggered the district court's obliga-
tion to evaluate the plaintiffs Title VII retaliation claim under a mixed
motive analysis. 
75
168. "This case does not require us to decide when, if ever, § 107 applies outside of the mixed-
motive context." Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 94 n. 1 (2003).
169. 540 U.S. 44, 50 (2003).
170. Griffith, 387 F.3d at 747 n. 1I (Magnuson, J., concurring).
171. Cuenca v. Univ. of Kansas, 101 F. App'x 782, 787-88 (1Oth Cir. 2004).
172. Stover v. Martinez, 382 F.3d 1064, 1075-76 (10th Cir. 2004).
173. Furaus v. Citadel Commc'ns Corp., 168 F. App'x 257, 260 (10th Cir. 2006).
174. Id.
175. McNulty v. Sandoval County, 222 F. App'x 770, 774 (1Oth Cir. 2007).
Ms. McNulty first complains that defendants did not raise a mixed motive analysis until
oral argument on their summary judgment motion. She argues that the district court erred
in employing this untimely-raised affirmative defense in granting summary judgment to
the defendants .... While Ms. McNulty is correct that the Supreme Court has described
the mixed-motive approach as most appropriately deemed an affirmative defense ... this
court has indicated that a mixed-motive analysis should be employed whenever it is ap-
propriate, not necessarily only when the defendant invokes it .... The district court in-
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Finally, it is unclear whether Desert Palace requires the Tenth Cir-
cuit to modify the traditional McDonnell Douglas framework. In a re-
cent unpublished opinion, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged that "some
courts and commentators have viewed the Desert Palace holding as re-
quiring a either a departure from or a modification of the McDonnell
Douglas framework."'' 76 The panel, however, declined to reach the issue.
The Tenth Circuit is not the only circuit that has struggled with the
meaning of Desert Palace. Other circuits have reached conflicting con-
clusions about its implications. 7 7  For example, the Fourth Circuit con-
cluded Desert Palace did not alter or nullify the traditional McDonnell
Douglas framework. 78 The Fifth Circuit, in contrast, extended the
court's reasoning in Price Waterhouse and Desert Palace to an ADEA
case, and adopted a "modified McDonnell Douglas approach" for analyz-
ing summary judgment motions. 179 Under this standard:
[T]he plaintiff must still demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimi-
nation; the defendant then must articulate a legitimate,
non-discriminatory reason for its decision to terminate the plaintiff;
and, if the defendant meets its burden of production, the plaintiff
must then offer sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact either (1) that the defendant's reason is not true, but is in-
stead a pretext for discrimination (pretext alternative); or (2) that the
defendant's reason, while true, is only one of the reasons for its con-
duct, and another "motivating factor" is the plaintiff's protected char-
acteristic (mixed-motive[s] alternative).
180
Finally, the Ninth Circuit permits plaintiffs to decide whether to
proceed under the traditional McDonnell Douglas framework or a mixed
motive analysis. As the court explained in McGinest v. GTE Service
Corp.:181
[A]lthough the McDonnell Douglas burden shifting framework is a
useful tool to assist plaintiffs at the summary judgment stage so that
they may reach trial, nothing compels the parties to invoke the
McDonnell Douglas presumption. Rather, when responding to a
summary judgment motion, the plaintiff is presented with a choice
terpreted Ms. McNulty's arguments and the evidence presented before it as requiring a
mixed-motive analysis. Given that defendants cited four reasons for terminating Ms.
McNulty's employment, and that one of the reasons was arguably retaliatory while the
others were unquestionably legitimate performance-based concerns, that interpretation
was reasonable.
Id. at 773-74 (internal quotation marks omitted).
176. Furaus, 168 F. App'x at 260.
177. For an overview of cases addressing Desert Palace's impact on the McDonnell Douglas
framework, see Plevan et al., supra note 160.
178. See, e.g., Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 317-18 (4th Cir.
2005).
179. Rachid v. Jack in the Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004).
180. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
181. 360 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 2004).
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regarding how to establish his or her case. [The plaintiff] may pro-
ceed by using the McDonnell Douglas framework, or alternatively,
may simply produce direct or circumstantial evidence demonstrating
that a discriminatory reason more likely than not motivated [the em-
ployer]. 1
82
As these cases demonstrate, there continues to be substantial confusion
in the Tenth Circuit and in other circuits about the implications of Desert
Palace.
D. Jury Confusion
A circuit split exists over whether the McDonnell Douglas frame-
work should be used when a case goes to the jury. Some courts permit
the jury to hear a burden-shifting instruction; others find that instruction
too confusing.
The Tenth Circuit has held that juries should not use the McDonnell
Douglas framework. 83 "Because the employer will present evidence of
a proper motive in almost every case, the ultimate question for the jury
simply becomes 'which party's explanation of the employer's motivation
it believes.'" 84  This stems from the Supreme Court's observation in
Aikens: "Where the defendant has done everything that would be re-
quired of him if the plaintiff had properly made out a prima facie case,
whether the plaintiff really did so is no longer relevant."'' 85 Thus, after a
case goes to the jury, a reviewing court's only role is "to review the re-
cord for substantial evidence supporting the jury's verdict.'
186
The court has "disapproved jury instructions which delineate the in-
tricacies of McDonnell Douglas because a jury is not well equipped to
understand the shifting burdens of such a formulation.' ' 8 7 "Our concern
with a McDonnell Douglas instruction is not that it favors one party over
another. It is that it unnecessarily complicates the jury's job, and unnec-
essary complexity increases the opportunity for error."'
' 88
A majority of circuits agree with the Tenth Circuit that the McDon-
nell Douglas burden-shifting scheme should not be introduced to the jury
through the jury instructions. Most conclude the only question that
182. Id. at 1122 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
183. Whittington v. Nordarn Group, Inc., 429 F.3d 986, 993 (10th Cir. 2005); Abuan v. Level 3
Commc'ns, Inc., 353 F.3d 1158, 1169 (10th Cir. 2003).
184. Whittington, 429 F.3d at 993 (quoting U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens, 460
U.S. 711, 716 (1983)).
185. Aikens, 460 U.S. at 715.
186. Whittington, 429 F.3d at 993.
187. Messina v. Kroblin Transp. Sys., Inc., 903 F.2d 1306, 1308 (10th Cir. 1990); Whittington,
429 F.3d at 998. But see Faulkner v. Super Valu Stores, Inc., 3 F.3d 1419, 1425, 1425 n.3 (10th Cir.
1993) (finding no error in a jury instruction that incorporated the entire McDonnell Douglas frame-
work because the instructions set forth the proper allocation of proof and directed the jury that age
must be the determinative factor in the failure to hire).
188. Whittington, 429 F.3d at 998.
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should go to the jury is the ultimate question of discrimination. 189 The
First, Second, and Seventh Circuits have taken a more ambiguous ap-
proach on the issue.' 90 The Sixth Circuit alone has not disparaged the
use of the McDonnell Douglas framework in jury instructions.191
III. REPLACING THE CURRENT FRAMEWORK
The current framework, stemming from the tripartite scheme first
announced in McDonnell Douglas, should be reconsidered in favor of a
simple sufficiency of the evidence approach. The plaintiff should main-
tain the burden of proof to convince the judge or jury that the adverse
employment decision about which the plaintiff complains resulted from a
discriminatory motive. In this way, the focus of the case is on whether or
not the employee suffered from discrimination.
Furthermore, an ordinary sufficiency of the evidence approach is
consistent with existing Supreme Court precedent. Hicks, Reeves, Aik-
ens, and Desert Palace have essentially eliminated the need for lower
courts to evaluate discrimination cases differently than other cases. No
189. Watson v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 207 F.3d 207, 221 (3d Cir. 2000) (holding that, although
it is proper "to instruct the jury that it may consider whether the factual predicates necessary to
establish the prima facie case have been shown," it is error to instruct the jury on the McDonnell
Douglas burden shifting scheme); Mullen v. Princess Anne Volunteer Fire Co., 853 F.2d 1130, 1137
(4th Cir. 1988) (noting that the "shifting burdens of production of Burdine... are beyond the func-
tion and expertise of the jury" and are "overly complex"); Walther v. Lone Star Gas Co., 952 F.2d
119, 127 (5th Ci. 1992) ("Instructing the jury on the elements of a prima facie case, presumptions,
and the shifting burden of proof is unnecessary and confusing. Instead, the court should instruct the
jury to consider the ultimate question of whether defendant terminated plaintiff because of his
age."); Ryther v. KARE 11, 108 F.3d 832, 849-50 (8th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (Loken, J., in Part II.A.
of the dissent, which a majority of the court joined) (holding that "the jury need only decide the
ultimate issue of intentional age discriminatien," and usually need not make findings on the prima
facie case or whether the defendant's explanation is pretextual); Sanghvi v. City of Claremont, 328
F.3d 532, 540 (9th Cir. 2003) ("[I]t is error to charge the jury with the elements of the McDonnell
Douglas prima facie case."); Dudley v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 166 F.3d 1317, 1322 (11 th Cir. 1999)
("[I]t is unnecessary and inappropriate to instruct the jury on the McDonnell Douglas analysis.").
190. Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1016 (1st Cir. 1979) ("McDonnell Douglas was not
written as a prospective jury charge; to read its technical aspects to a jury, as was done here, will add
little to the jury's understanding of the case .... "); Cabrera v. Jakabovitz, 24 F.3d 372, 381-82 (2d
Cir. 1994) (holding that, although a jury instruction that included the phrase "prima facie case" and
referred to "defendant's 'burden' of produc[tion]" "created a distinct risk of confusing the jury," in
certain instances it would be appropriate to instruct the jury on the elements of a prima facie case);
Gehring v. Case Corp., 43 F.3d 340, 343 (7th Cir. 1994) ("Once the judge finds that the plaintiff has
made the minimum necessary demonstration (the 'prima facie case') and that the defendant has
produced an age-neutral explanation, the burden-shifting apparatus has served its purpose, and the
only remaining question-the only question the jury need answer-is whether the plaintiff is a
victim of intentional discrimination."). But see Rowlett v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 832 F.2d 194, 200
(1st Cir. 1987) ("[T]he district court was correct in using the framework in the instructions to the
jury" because "[i]t is a straightforward way of explaining how to consider whether there is inten-
tional discrimination."), abrogated on other grounds by lacobucci v. Boulter, 193 F.3d 14, 27 (1st
Cir. 1999); Lynch v. Belden & Co., 882 F.2d 262, 269 (7th Cir. 1989) ("[I]t was proper for the
district court to instruct the jury as to the McDonnell Douglas/Burdine formula for evaluating indi-
rect evidence .... [Such an instruction] accurately informed the jury of the parties' burdens ... 
(footnote omitted)).
191. Gafford v. Gen. Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 167, 167 n.9 (6th Cir. 1993) (holding that it was
not error to "guid[e] the jury through a three-stage order of proof as opposed to instructing solely on
the ultimate issue of sex discrimination").
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formal three-step framework is needed to allow a plaintiff to prove dis-
criminatory intent through the use of circumstantial evidence.' 
92
Moving to a sufficiency of the evidence approach would have the
salutary effect of minimizing the need for the artificial categories of evi-
dence currently used by the courts of appeals. Although these categories
have become somewhat entrenched, they are too divorced from relevant
statutory and case law to be sustained. These artificially created catego-
ries of evidence-including "disturbing procedural irregularities," "prior
treatment of plaintiff," and "subjective criteria"-could be abandoned in
favor of a simpler, more straightforward analysis. The federal courts
should be focused on the ultimate question of whether the plaintiff has
brought forth sufficient evidence for a factfinder to conclude the plaintiff
suffered discrimination. The various categories of circumstantial evi-
dence used by plaintiffs and courts today only tend to cloud the issues.
A more direct analysis would keep all parties focused on the ultimate
question of discrimination.
Ideally, courts could also eliminate the artificial distinction between
mixed motive and single motive Title VII cases. As explained above,
nothing in the text of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 supports this dichot-
omy. At the very least, courts could adopt the approach followed by the
Ninth Circuit of permitting plaintiffs to choose whether they prefer to
pursue their claim under a mixed motive or a single motive framework.
Such an approach implicitly eliminates the relevancy of the McDonnell
Douglas analysis in Title VII cases because most (if not all) plaintiffs
would prefer to pursue their case under the less onerous and more statu-
torily anchored mixed motive framework. The mixed motive frame-
work, furthermore, closely resembles an ordinary sufficiency of the evi-
dence standard.
CONCLUSION
The McDonnell Douglas tripartite scheme has survived a long time.
But that is not a sufficient justification for continuing to rigidly adhere to
its precepts. Lower courts have struggled to implement the burden-
shifting framework for over thirty years. It may now be time to replace
the framework with a simpler, more direct method of determining the
question of discrimination.
192. Wells v. Colorado Dep't of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1223 (10th Cir. 2003) (Hartz, J., concur-
ring); see also Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147 (2000) (It is a "general
principle of evidence law that the factfinder is entitled to consider a party's dishonesty about a mate-
rial fact as affirmative evidence of guilt.") (internal quotation marks omitted); Martin J. Katz, Re-
claiming McDonnell Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 109, 130 (2007) ("This chain of permissive
inferences-from error, to lie, to cover-up, to discrimination-is similar to inferences that are rou-
tinely used in other parts of the law.").
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